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We assess the effects of oil price uncertainty on Nigeria’s real output from the first 
quarter of 1980 to the first quarter of 2019. We achieve this objective by decomposing 
oil price uncertainty into positive and negative uncertainties. We then quantify the 
responses of output to these uncertainties. Using the conditional variance of real 
returns in composite refiners’ acquisition cost of crude oil as our measure of oil price 
uncertainty, we find that positive uncertainty leads to a decline in output, whereas 
negative uncertainty leads to a rise in output. The response of output to these 
uncertainties is asymmetric.
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I. INTRODUCTION
We assess the effects of oil price uncertainty on the real output of Nigeria, an oil-
producing country. Unexpected changes in oil prices introduce another source of 
concern for all countries, especially since such changes have become pronounced 
in recent years (Chuku et al., 2011). Oil, hydroelectric power, and natural gas are 
the main sources of energy and thus count among the core drivers of the real 
economy. Hence, volatility in oil prices is a major issue for policymakers. Elder and 
Serletis (2010) elaborate on the theoretical transmission channels of real oil price 
shocks to the rest of the economy. They note that real oil price shocks transmit 
directly to real balances and monetary policy. An increase in oil prices leads to a 
rise in the overall price level and then to a drop in the real money balance held by 
households and firms, which, in turn, depresses aggregate demand. In addition, 
changes in oil prices induce income transfer. For example, if oil prices increase, 
incomes are transferred from oil-importing to oil-exporting countries, and vice 
versa.
Nigeria is an oil-producing country whose economic activities are largely 
driven by oil revenues (Ayadi, 2005). The economy depends largely on oil, so 
shocks to oil prices can have extensive ramifications to its fundamentals. For 
example, oil accounted for over 90% of Nigeria’s export revenues and over 90% of 
its foreign exchange earnings in 2004 alone. In addition, over 80% of government 
revenue comes from oil (Ayadi, 2005). Since the country exports oil, increases in oil 
prices should generate savings to ensure high investment levels and sustainable 
growth (Chuku et al., 2011; Iwayemi and Fowowe, 2011). Iwayemi and Fowowe 
(2011) argue that, because Nigeria exports oil, positive shocks to oil prices should 
directly translate into faster economic growth. However, this is not the entire 
story. As Chuku et al. (2011) observe, apart from being an oil exporter, Nigeria also 
imports oil. Hence, the appropriate effect of oil price shocks could lie somewhere 
in between. Nigeria imports most of its technology-oriented goods, such as home 
appliances, televisions, cars, and computers. These goods are mostly produced 
using oil-intensive plants and should therefore become more expensive as oil 
prices increase. The implication is that positive oil price shocks lead to imported 
inflation and the depletion of external reserves due to currency depreciation, both 
unfavorable indicators for real output growth. Positive oil price shocks have the 
potential to generate a boom in the oil sector, as well as the potential for a Dutch 
disease problem, thereby shrinking productivity in the rest of the economy.
Prior to the 1970s, oil prices were quite stable. In the 1970s, conversely, oil 
prices experienced a rapid increase, rising from their previous levels of about 
$40 per barrel to slightly above $100 per barrel. At the turn of the 1980s, these 
prices dropped to nearly $20 per barrel and persisted at this level until around 
2001 (Hamilton, 2009). Oil prices started rising faster toward the peak of the recent 
housing market bubble in the United States (i.e., around 2006) and reached an all-
time high of $145 per barrel during the peak of the recent financial crisis (Hamilton, 
2009). The volatility and sharp rises in oil prices have reignited the literature on 
the role of oil prices in the real economy. This literature dates far back to seminal 
papers such as those of Hamilton (1983, 1988), Mork (1989), Lee et al. (1995), and 
Hooker (1996). These studies have generally found an inverse relation between 
oil price shocks and the real economy, and thus provide comprehensive policy 
insights; see also Narayan et al. (2014) and Narayan and Sharma (2011).
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Recently, these findings have been corroborated by, for example, Hooker 
(2002), who finds positive oil price shocks drove up US core inflation rates, 
depressing productivity before 1981; Barsky and Kilian (2004); and Edelstein and 
Kilian (2009), who find similar evidence. In particular, Barsky and Kilian (2004), 
and Edelstein and Kilian (2009) find that oil price shocks significantly affect the real 
economy through a supply channel by increasing the cost of production, which 
then reduces production. Later, Hamilton (2009) also finds this to be the case, with 
oil price shocks exerting a negative and significant impact on the US economy.
Other studies find that, apart from oil price changes, oil price volatility does 
not bode well with the real economy. For example, Elder and Serletis (2010) 
find oil price uncertainty to affect the US economy negatively and significantly. 
They analyze the real options and investment model, by looking at consumption 
patterns under the uncertainty of future returns, and find oil price volatility to 
reduce some components of aggregate investment. Their finding is generally 
consistent with real options theory, which argues that firms can delay or even 
abandon their investments in an environment, whereby future returns become 
increasingly uncertain as the degree of uncertainty amplifies. This view is shared 
by older studies, such as those of Bernanke (1983) and Pindyck (1991), and a study 
by Lee et al. (2011), who assess the effects of oil price shocks on firms’ investment 
decisions in the US manufacturing sector. Lee et al. (2011) find firm stock 
price volatility alongside future oil price uncertainty to negatively affect firms’ 
investment decisions for at least the first and second years after the initial shock.
A number of studies have investigated the effects of oil price shocks on various 
macroeconomic variables in the case of Nigeria. For example, Ayadi et al. (2000) 
examine the impact of the energy (or oil) sector on the Nigerian economy, including 
the financial markets, using standard vector autoregression (VAR) and find the 
energy sector exerts significant influence on the economy. In addition, Ayadi (2005) 
analyzes the relation between oil price changes and economic development via 
industrial production with standard VAR and finds that an increase in oil prices 
does not lead to an increase in industrial production in Nigeria. Recent studies have 
revisited the issue. For example, Chuku et al. (2011) assess the relation between 
oil price shocks and current account dynamics in Nigeria using a standard VAR 
and find oil price shocks to have a significant short-run effect on current account 
balances. Moreover, Iwayemi and Fowowe (2011) find oil price shocks to have a 
weak impact on most macroeconomic variables in Nigeria.
The major limitation of these studies is that they fail to account for the 
observed volatility in oil prices, and therefore neglect an important transmission 
channel. Our paper can be seen as an important improvement on these studies. 
In particular, our paper is an extension of studies on oil price shocks and the real 
economy. It is closely related to the work of Elder and Serletis (2010), who examine 
the role of oil price uncertainty in the real economy for the United States. Unlike 
their study, however, we consider an oil-producing economy that is also an oil 
importer. Specifically, we analyze the effect of oil price uncertainty on the real 
output. We then determine whether the real output responds asymmetrically to 
oil price shocks.
The majority of studies tend to examine the effects of oil price shocks on the 
real economy within single-equation models. These models do not account for oil 
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price volatility (or any kind of volatility, for that matter), which is said to have 
amplified since the early 1970s. Historical events suggest that particular time 
series, such as those of oil prices, exhibit different volatilities and, more frequently 
than not, time-varying volatilities (Fama, 1965). These studies’ failure to account 
for such volatilities can lead to underestimation of the impact of oil price changes 
on the real economy. Models that are suited to handle such volatilities have been 
proposed by Bollerslev (1986) and extensions thereof. 
Our paper addresses this issue by using a model that accounts for reverse 
causality, as well as volatility/uncertainty in oil prices. Our model decomposes 
oil price uncertainty into two components, positive and negative uncertainties. 
The model’s key property is that it allows us to explore differences in oil price 
uncertainties. That is, we are able to estimate and observe whether oil price 
uncertainties have symmetric effects. This improvement is particularly useful to 
policymakers, because the standard VAR simulates the response of the real economy 
to oil price shocks—positive or negative—by permitting conditional means of the 
variables in the model to interact, thereby excluding other transmission channels. 
Our augmented VAR model, in contrast, offers the policymaker standard VAR 
transmission channels and an additional channel with which to assess the response 
of the real economy to oil price shocks, namely, the volatility channel as indexed 
by the decomposed general autoregressive conditional heteroskedastic (GARCH) 
measure of uncertainty.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents our 
model. Section III describes the data and the empirical results. Section IV concludes 
the paper.
II. MODEL SPECIFICATION
A. VAR Model of Oil Price Uncertainty and Output
We analyze the impact of oil price uncertainty on output using the following VAR 
model:
where Xt represents an n×1 vector containing the output and measures of oil 
price uncertainty, βi is an n×n parameter to be estimated, ut denotes an error term 
whose variance–covariance matrix is Σ, and q and t are lag and time subscripts, 
respectively.
We identify oil price shocks through the error term ut. The practical way of 
identifying these shocks remains a debatable topic. Suppose that we normalize ut 
into vt (i.e., E[vt vt’ ]=In). Then a matrix A exists such that ut=Avt. The jth column of A 
is the instant effect of the jth innovation on all the variables. The innovation is one 
standard error in size (Iyke, 2018; Juhro and Iyke, 2019). The matrix A is restricted 
such that we have the variance–covariance matrix
(1)
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This equation implies that n(n-1)/2 degrees of freedom are left in the model. 
This is not sufficient to identify shocks to ut. We identify the oil price shocks by 
restricting A to be a Cholesky factor of Σ; that is, we apply a recursive ordering of 
Yt.
B. Computing Positive and Negative Oil Price Uncertainties
We compute the indicator of oil price uncertainty using the GARCH model (Iyke 
and Ho, 2018a). Specifically, we estimate the variance of the first difference of 
the logarithm of real oil price, oprt=ln(opt)-ln(opt-1), or oil price returns from the 
GARCH(1, 1) model
(2)
where opr is oil price returns, which is stationary by construction; τ is the mean 
value of oil price returns; τ0 and τ1 are parameters of the model; and εt is the error 
term with zero mean and a conditional variance of known form σt
2, which is the 
measure of oil price uncertainty. The functional form of σt
2 is modeled as
(3)
where , α1, and β1 are parameters of the model.
We compute increases (positive changes) and decreases (negative changes) 
in oil price uncertainty by decomposing oil price uncertainty into positive and 
negative partial sums as follows (see Iyke and Ho, 2018b)
(4)
where oput+ and oput- are, respectively, the partial sums of the positive and negative 
changes in opu, oil price uncertainty. They are defined formally as
(5)
(6)
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III. DATA AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS
We measure the price of oil as the composite refiners’ acquisition cost of crude oil, 
which is compiled by the US Department of Energy. This measure is calculated 
as the weighted average of domestic and imported crude oil costs, including 
transportation and other fees paid by refiners. This price index therefore measures 
the price of crude oil as an input to production. Since this price index takes into 
account the cost of imported oil, it measures oil prices more broadly than domestic 
price measures, such as the West Texas Intermediate crude oil price, which is the 
price paid to US producers (Elder and Serletis, 2010).
We arrive at our final measure for the real oil price by deflating the RAC of 
crude oil by the US gross domestic product (GDP) deflator, which is available from 
the website of the Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis. We measure the real output by 
the real GDP. The data on real GDP are obtained from the Central Bank of Nigeria. 
The original data are in the local currency (i.e., naira). We convert these figures 
from naira to US dollars by multiplying the real GDP (in naira) by the dollar–naira 
exchange rate, obtained from the Central Bank of Nigeria. The growth rates are in 
natural logarithms.
Our sample begins in the first quarter of 1980 and ends in the first quarter of 
2019 (i.e., 1980:1–2019:1). Consistent with other studies (e.g., Iyke and Ho, 2018a), 
we measure oil price uncertainty as the conditional variance from a GARCH(1, 1) 
model of oil price returns, as described above.
We begin by testing for the stationary properties of real oil prices and real 
output using two tests: the Phillips–Perron and the Dickey–Fuller generalized 
least squares tests. The tests show that both variables are stationary in the first 
difference (see Table 1). Hence, we use the first differences of the variables, which 
are, by definition, the real oil price returns and the real output growth. Figure 1 
shows the plots of the variable levels, as well as their first differences. Real output 
has been considerably lower in the 2000s because the dollar–naira exchange rate 
has been high during this period.
Table 1.
 Tests for Stationarity
The table shows the results of the PP and DF-GLS stationarity tests. The null hypothesis is that variables are non-
stationary. The reported test statistics are compared with the PP and DF-GLS critical values. The variables are in 
logarithms: their first differences represent growth (returns). The *** and * represent, respectively, 1% and 10% 
significance levels. NA denotes not applicable. The sample period is 1980:01 to 2019:01.
Variable
Panel A: Level
Intercept Intercept and Trend
PP DF-GLS PP DF-GLS
Real Oil Price
Real Output
-1.963
-1.873
-1.433
-1.158
-2.249
-2.886
-1.679
-2.843*
Panel B: First difference
Intercept Intercept and Trend
PP DF-GLS PP DF-GLS
Real Oil Price
Real Output
-9.196***
-8.631***
-8.572***
-9.973***
-9.214***
-8.584***
-8.681***
NA
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Figure 1. Real Oil Price and Real Output
This figure shows plots of the variables in their levels, as well as their first differences. The first differences are 
necessary since the variables are not stationary. By construction, the first differences represent real oil price growth/
returns and real output growth. The sample period is 1980:01 to 2019:01.
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Figure 1. Real Oil Price and Real Output (Continued)
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In addition to the stationarity tests, we perform lag selection tests. This allows 
us to include the appropriate lags in our model. The lag selection is based on the 
final prediction error, the Akaike information criterion, the Schwarz information 
criterion, and the Hannan–Quinn information criterion. The results are shown 
in Table 2. We find that a maximum of five lags is permissible in our analysis. 
However, since the data are quarterly, we include four lags in our estimations.
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Because the variables in our model could be cointegrated, we proceed to test for 
cointegration. We apply Johansen cointegration tests after restricting the number 
of lags to four. The results are reported in Table 3. Using both the trace and the 
maximum eigenvalue tests, we see that the variables are cointegrated. Specifically, 
there are at most two cointegration relations. This implies that, if output and oil 
prices diverge due to a sudden oil price or output shock, they tend to converge 
in the long run, because a common force is pulling them toward a common path.
Table 2.
Lag Length Selection
The table shows the results of the lag selection tests. LR, LogL, FPE, AIC, SIC, and HQ are, respectively, the sequential 
modified Likelihood Ratio test statistic (each test at 5% level), Log-likelihood, Final prediction error, Akaike 
information criterion, Schwarz information criterion, and Hannan-Quinn information criterion. * and NA indicate lag 
order selected by the criterion and not applicable, respectively. The sample period is 1980:01 to 2019:01.
Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ
0 -3578.590 NA 2.92E+17 48.729 48.790 48.754
1 -2839.780 1437.411 1.42E+13 38.800 39.044 38.899
2 -2827.469 23.450 1.36E+13 38.755 39.182 38.928
3 -2813.418 26.191 1.27E+13 38.686 39.296 38.934
4 -2771.022 77.293 8.07E+12 38.232 39.025* 38.554*
5 -2761.208 17.492* 7.99E+12* 38.221* 39.197 38.617
6 -2756.802 7.672 8.52E+12 38.283 39.443 38.754
7 -2751.673 8.724 9.01E+12 38.336 39.678 38.881
8 -2747.301 7.257 9.62E+12 38.399 39.924 39.019
Table 3.
 Test for Cointegration
The table reports the results of the Johansen’s Maximum-eigen value and Trace tests for cointegration. No. of CE(s) 
indicates the number of cointegration relations or equations. The * denotes rejection of the null hypothesis at the 0.05 
level and ** denotes MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values. The sample period is 1980:01 to 2019:01.
Hypothesized
Panel A: Trace test
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.**
None * 0.264 70.249 29.797 0.000
At most 1 * 0.129 24.314 15.495 0.002
At most 2 0.023 3.567 3.841 0.059
Panel B: Maximum-eigen value test
None * 0.264 45.935 21.132 0.000
At most 1 * 0.129 20.747 14.265 0.004
At most 2 0.023 3.567 3.841 0.059
Since the variables are cointegrated, equation (1) will not account for the short-
run deviation of variables from equilibrium. Hence, we proceed by converting 
equation (1) into a vector error correction model. Because we are only concerned 
with the reaction of output to oil price uncertainty, we report only the real output 
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equation. Table 4 shows the estimated error correction model for real output. Note 
that a maximum of four lags is included in the model. We see that positive oil price 
uncertainty (i.e., positive changes in uncertainty) has a negative impact on real 
output, while negative oil price uncertainty (negative changes in uncertainty) has 
a positive impact. The error correction term is negative and statistically significant, 
which suggests convergence. That is, 37% of the deviation of the output and oil 
price from equilibrium is corrected each quarter.
Table 4.
Estimates of The Error Correction Model
The table reports the estimates of a vector error correction model (VECM) version of Equation (1). Standard errors 
and t-statistics are in the round and square brackets, respectively. ∆ is the first difference operator. The estimation 
period is 1980:02 to 2019:01.
Lags
Variable 1 2 3 4
∆ Real Output -0.548 -0.621 -0.506 -0.092
(0.105) (0.101) (0.099) (0.088)
[-5.237] [-6.148] [-5.093] [-1.052]
∆ Positive Real Oil Price Uncertainty -0.007 -0.008 -0.004 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
[-3.344] [-4.159] [-2.119] [-0.353]
∆ Negative Real Oil Price Uncertainty 0.010 0.021 0.009 0.005
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
[ 1.398] [ 2.948] [ 1.343] [0.786]
Error Correction Term -0.374
(0.101)
[-3.710]
 Adjusted R-squared 0.545
While the estimated error correction model above suggests that oil price 
uncertainties have an asymmetric impact on output, the picture is still unclear. We 
therefore proceed to generate the impulse responses following shocks to positive 
and negative oil price uncertainties (i.e., positive and negative changes in oil price 
uncertainty).
Aside from imposing lower triangularity on A in the fashion outlined in 
equation (2), we obtain our impulse response functions (IRFs) using 1,000 Markov 
chain Monte Carlo draws, a horizon of 10 quarters ahead, and four lags. The shock 
is one standard error in size, which confines the IRFs to the 16% and the 84% 
quantiles. The IRFs are displayed in Figure 2.
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Figure 2. Impulse Responses of Real Output to Positive and 
Negative Oil Price Uncertainties
The figure shows the impulse responses obtained from our model. We imposed lower triangularity on A in a fashion 
outlined in Equation (2). The impulse responses are generated based on 1000 Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) 
draws, a horizon of 10-quarters ahead, and 4 lags. The shock is one standard error in size (i.e. Cholesky one standard 
deviations), confining the impulse responses to the region of 16% and the 84% quantiles. The estimation period is 
1980:02 to 2019:01.
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A positive (negative) oil price shock, which leads to a sudden rise (fall) in oil 
price uncertainty, has a significant and immediate impact on real output. Sudden 
positive changes in oil price uncertainty lead to a fall in real output of 8% from 
baseline by the third quarter. Real output climbs back to its baseline during the 
fourth quarter and then rises above it by 4% in the fifth quarter ahead. Real output 
then falls by 3% below its baseline in the seventh quarter. Beyond this point, the 
impact of the shock is not substantial. The impact disappears by the 10th quarter 
(see Figure 2).
By contrast, sudden negative changes in oil price uncertainty lead to a rise 
in real output, up to the third quarter. That is, real output increases by 6% at the 
end of the third quarter. Real output then declines to its baseline and below by 
the fourth quarter. The impact of the oil price shock (i.e., one that affects negative 
changes in oil price uncertainty) disappears by the sixth quarter.
Generally speaking, since the response of real output to a positive uncertainty 
is not a mirror image of the response to negative uncertainty, we can conclude 
that the impacts are asymmetric. We carry out a robustness check of our results by 
converting the series into domestic currency, the naira. The results—not tabulated 
here to conserve space but available upon request—are qualitatively similar to 
those presented here. Specifically, we find the variables are cointegrated, sudden 
positive changes in real oil price uncertainty have a negative impact on real output, 
and sudden negative changes in real oil price uncertainty have a positive impact 
on real output following the shock. The impacts are asymmetric.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we assessed the effects of oil price uncertainty on the real output in 
Nigeria during the period 1980:1–2019:1. The theory posits a negative response of 
the real economy to oil price uncertainty. Studies have often narrowed the empirics 
to non–oil-producing countries, which is why we pursued the issue by considering 
an oil-producing country, Nigeria. We attained this objective by employing a 
VAR model that accounts for two components of oil price uncertainty. That is, we 
decompose oil price uncertainty into positive and negative uncertainties. Positive 
uncertainty measures positive changes in oil price uncertainty, while negative 
uncertainty measures negative changes in oil price uncertainty. The decomposed 
uncertainty measure is obtained from the conditional variance of a GARCH(1, 1) 
model of oil price returns. We find that real output tends to respond negatively 
to positive real oil price uncertainty, and positively to negative real oil price 
uncertainty. The responses of real output following positive and negative real oil 
price uncertainties are asymmetric. Our results remained robust to denominating 
the series in local currency. Our empirical results on oil price uncertainty fairly 
reflect the two main characteristics noted in the relation between real output and 
oil prices. In the mid-1980s, the sharp decline in oil prices failed to generate the 
rapid output growth predicted by theory. Similarly, the episode of sharp increases 
in oil prices from 2002 to 2008 failed to generate the recession expected in many 
countries.
Real Output and Oil Price Uncertainty in an Oil-Producing Country 175
REFERENCES
Ayadi, O.F. (2005). Oil Price Fluctuations and the Nigerian economy. OPEC Energy 
Review, 29, 199–217.
Ayadi, O. F., Chatterjee, A., and Obi, C. P. (2000). A Vector Autoregressive Analysis 
of an Oil-Dependent Emerging Economy – Nigeria. OPEC Review, 24, 329–349.
Barsky, R.B., and Kilian, L. (2004). Oil and the Macroeconomy since the 1970s. 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 18, 115–134.
Bernanke, B.S. (1983). Irreversibility, Uncertainty, and Cyclical Investment. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 98, 85–106.
Bollerslev, T. (1986). Generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity. 
Journal of Econometrics, 31, 307–327.
Chuku, C.A., Akpan, U.F., Sam, N.R., and Effiong, E.L. (2011). Oil price shocks and 
the dynamics of current account balances in Nigeria. OPEC Energy Review, 35, 
119–139.
Edelstein, P., and Kilian, L. (2009). How Sensitive Are Consumer Expenditures to 
Retail Energy Prices? Journal of Monetary Economics, 56, 766–79.
Elder, J., Serletis, A. (2010). Oil Price Uncertainty. Journal of Money, Credit and 
Banking, 42, 1138–1159.
Fama, E.F. (1965). The Behavior of Stock Market Prices. Journal of Business, 38, 34–
105.
Hamilton, J.D. (1983). Oil and the Macroeconomy since World War II. Journal of 
Political Economy, 91, 228–48.
Hamilton, J.D. (1988). A Neoclassical Model of Unemployment and The Business 
Cycle. Journal of Political Economy, 96, 593–617.
Hamilton, J.D. (2009). Causes and Consequences of the Oil Shock of 2007–08. 
San Diego. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2009 University of 
California.
Hooker, M.A. (1996). What Happened to the Oil Price–Macroeconomy 
Relationship? Journal of Monetary Economics, 38, 195–213.
Hooker, M.A. (2002). Are Oil Shocks Inflationary? Asymmetric and Nonlinear 
Specifications Versus Changes in Regime. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 
34, 540–561.
Iwayemi, A., and Fowowe, B. (2011). Impact of Oil Price Shocks on Selected 
Macroeconomic Variables in Nigeria. Energy Policy, 39, 603–612.
Iyke, B. N. (2018). Assessing the Effects of Housing Market Shocks on Output: The 
Case of South Africa. Studies in Economics and Finance, 35(2), 287-306.
Iyke, B. N., & Ho, S. Y. (2018a). Real Exchange Rate Volatility and Domestic 
Consumption in Ghana. The Journal of Risk Finance, 19(5), 513-523.
Iyke, B. N., & Ho, S. Y. (2018b). Nonlinear Effects of Exchange Rate Changes on 
the South African Bilateral Trade Balance. The Journal of International Trade & 
Economic Development, 27, 350-363.
Juhro, S. M., & Iyke, B. N. (2019). Monetary Policy and Financial Conditions in 
Indonesia. Buletin Ekonomi Moneter dan Perbankan, 21, 283-302.
Lee, K., Shawn, N., Ratti, R.A. (1995). Oil shocks and the macroeconomy: the role 
of price variability. Energy Journal, 16, 39–56.
Lee, K., Kang, W., Ratti, R.A. (2011). Oil Price Shocks, Firm Uncertainty, and 
Investment. Macroeconomic Dynamics, 15 (3), 416–436.
Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, Volume 22, Number 2, 2019176
Mork, K.A., (1989). Oil and the macroeconomy. When Prices Go Up and Down: 
An Extension of Hamilton’s Results. Journal of Political Economy, 97, 740–744.
Narayan, P.K., Sharma, S., Poon, W.C., and Westerlund, J. (2014) Do Oil Prices 
Predict Economic Growth? New Global Evidence. Energy Economics, 41, 137-
146.
Narayan, P.K., and Sharma, S.S. (2011) New Evidence on Oil Price and Firm 
Returns. Journal of Banking and Finance, 35, 3252-3262.
Pindyck, R.H. (1991). Irreversibility, Uncertainty, and Investment. Journal of 
Economic Literature, 29, 110–148.
